By Dr. Yaqub Ibrahimi

In the six rounds of bilateral talks between Zalmai Khalilzad and the Taliban, there was no promising prospect for Afghanistan. Khalilzad’s diplomacy and the so-called Qatar process have had three clear outcomes: the isolation of the government of Afghanistan, the increase of Taliban’s political legitimacy, and the mobilization of the Kabul-based political elite as a competing parallel force to the government. The three outcomes are in the Taliban’s ideal interest and, therefore, the Khalilzad diplomacy has served to materialize this interest. Using the Khalilzad card, the Taliban autonomously move forward claiming itself as a shadow government. Hence, the Khalilzad doctrine is dangerous for an independent, democratic, progressive, and inclusive Afghanistan. This diplomacy has four key elements which I articulate bellow and explain my reasons about its catastrophic consequences.  

1. Isolation of the Government: The Khalilzad approach has isolated the government of Afghanistan despite it being the prime legitimate source of authority in the country and the main target of the Taliban. This approach has commenced a process which has moved in the direction of a Taliban domination scenario requiring the integration of the government into the Taliban insurgency structure. This process is in line with the Taliban’s expectation but contradicts most findings from insurgency settlement studies which recommend the integration of insurgencies into a state-led political process as the only sustainable solution. Given the U.S. inclination to withdraw its troops and reduce its expenses in Afghanistan, it is plausible that this process further weakens the security capacity and aid-dependent economy of the country. The security and legitimacy vacuum which would emerge from a decline in international support will facilitate the rise of the Taliban as a prominent party downgrading the government to a political-military faction. This situation will also arouse armed reaction by other national and identity-based factions claiming self-defense. As a result, Afghanistan will face a new wave of insurgency not only by the Taliban but also by many others. The fragmented state and its consequent security gap will provide safe havens for terrorist organizations, contrary to the Khalilzad expectation of “a Taliban promise to not allow terrorist attacks [on the U.S.] from Afghanistan.”   
2. Lack of Inclusiveness: Khalilzad has approached the conflict and conflict resolution in Afghanistan exclusively as a U.S.-Taliban business failing to include other internal and external parties and factors involved in the conflict and efforts for conflict resolution.  The conflict suffers from and is influenced by a multiplicity of players while the Qatar process has undermined the necessity of outlining a blueprint on how to include those parties. In an environment defined by competing interests between external players and in the meanwhile conflicting positions inside the country, I cast doubt upon a sole bilateral Taliban vs. U.S. approach and that it would lead to an inclusive peace process. Lessons from previous years and also from many other insurgency wars inform us that without bringing all parties on one page, a viable peace cannot be brought about. The Taliban are not only the enemy of the government but also against all layers of the Afghan society who believe in an independent, democratic, progressive, and inclusive Afghanistan. Those layers of the Afghan social fabric not only include the women, the youth, the democrats, war victims, and students but also all social forces that perceive the Taliban’s worldview and politics inadmissible for a democratic Afghanistan. Their voices and visions are absent from Khalilzad’s doctrine. These social forces will resist a Taliban domination and no peace could be brought about without taking them into consideration. 
3. The Sanctuaries Factor: The Taliban has been a pro-Pakistani insurgent group that was created and supported by Pakistani establishment during the Afghan civil war to secure Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan and to balance the Indian influence in the region. Following the U.S. invasion in 2001, the insurgency and its leadership have been based in Pakistan receiving military and financial support from the country’s army, intelligence, and religious sources. The Taliban leadership council is known as the Quetta Shura and its subsets including the Haqqani Network and the Peshawar Council are based in Pakistan’s territory. However, despite the significance of sanctuaries in the Taliban’s survival and momentum, they are not highlighted as a crucial factor in Khalilzad’s negotiation agenda. The history of insurgency wars informs us that without closing an insurgent group’s cross-border sanctuaries the possibility of settling it politically is gravely low. In the presence of cross-border sanctuaries, insurgent groups would continue their exhausting attacks while using negotiation tables as platforms for increasing political legitimacy. Today, parallel to negotiations in Qatar, the Taliban continue terrorist attacks in Kabul and beyond most of which are planned and directed in those sanctuaries. The Khalilzad approach has failed to bring the sanctuaries issue to the negotiation table.
4. Quick Results at Any Cost: As a war-torn country, the persistence of state institutions and the continuation of the democratic process defined in the constitution are crucial for the stability of Afghanistan and the region. Khalilzad’s reliance on an illusionary promise by an insurgent group undermines this priority. The Taliban structure, capacity, and governance mechanisms experienced in the late 1990s provide evidential reasons to not expect effective governance from the insurgent group. The Taliban leadership and cadre, mostly with primary Islamic education, lack the capacity to run a state effectively and, despite Khalilzad’s expectation, afford a “promise to not allow terrorist attacks [on the U.S.] from Afghanistan.” Experience shows that international terrorist organizations nest in security vacuums left behind in highly fragile states. While ISIS is defeated in the Middles East and its thousands of committed and experienced fighters are in search for a new safe haven, fragile states such as Afghanistan offer a breeding ground for those fighters. Even in the best case scenario, the Taliban is not in a position to block their way, Afghanistan’s trained and orderly armed force is.

Overall, Khalilzad’s diplomacy is designed in an American pre-election environment seeking quick foreign policy results for president Trump’s presidential campaign. However, the American election’s short-sightedness will adversely affect long-term peace in Afghanistan proceeding against the long-term U.S. policy in the country and the region. Moreover, in a post-ISIS era when thousands of ISIS members search for safe havens and, concurrently, the vulnerability of Afghanistan to international terrorism is not entirely fixed, Khalilzad expects from an insurgent group that accommodated al-Qaeda and its leadership in the 1990s, to avoid terrorist attacks from Afghanistan. Such an expectation is far from realities on the ground. Finally, peace and stability require a comprehensive reconciliation process. Such a process would make sure the structure and culture of the conflict are transformed in an inclusive and step-by-step agenda incorporating measures that address the root causes of the war, deal with war crimes, and restore the broken relationships in a way that disputants learn to overcome polarization, manage contradictions, and celebrate differences. These requirements and priorities have no place in Khalilzad’s diplomacy.

Dr. Yaqub Ibrahimi is a political science lecturer at Carleton University in Ottawa and a senior research fellow at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies.

Academicians and Officials interested to publish their academic pieces on this page, please approach us through: opinions@aiss.af

The article does not reflect the official opinion of the AISS.