By Ben Acheson

NATO is leaving Afghanistan – a fact well understood by Afghans. Such clarity in messaging should even be considered a success, given how often NATO and Western allies struggled with communicating their role and intentions to the Afghan public. More clear messaging is now needed as withdrawal nears completion, especially to convey how NATO’s strategic thinking is evolving.

At the recent NATO Summit in Brussels on June 14th, Heads of State agreed that NATO’s Strategic Concept should be updated and progress should be made on the ‘NATO 2030’ agenda. The former is the document that outlines NATO’s purpose and tasks (last updated in 2010). The latter is the NATO Secretary General’s initiative to “future-proof” the alliance against new threats. Having been central in NATO strategy since the early 2000s, Afghans deserve clarity on where Afghanistan fits into NATO’s new strategic thinking.

Or, where it doesn’t.

Why NATO’s Strategic Thinking is Changing

NATO’s strategy shift is driven by a rapidly changing security environment. A new era of great-power rivalry is emerging. The US-dominated ‘unipolar’ era of the 1990s and early 2000s is over. But there is no return to the ‘bipolar’ Cold War era. Instead, a ‘multipolar’ era is unfolding, and will be characterised by numerous influencers and multiple threats. Terrorism, nuclear proliferation and Russian antics will still pose risks to Euro-Atlantic security. But NATO’s policymakers also face an assortment of non-traditional challenges and evolving tools of warfare, including:

• China’s Rise: China was the hot topic at the recent Summit and is already changing NATO’s strategic calculus, especially as some projections cite that its GDP and military spending could overtake the US by 2030 (or sooner). Chinese strategic investments in European infrastructure are also forcing NATO allies into difficult choices between trade and defence.

• Cyber-Attacks and Emerging Technologies: Cyber/hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure are proliferating. Artificial intelligence, quantum technology and hypersonic technology are also changing warfare. To maintain a technological edge and be resilient to changing instruments of state power, a strategic surge in this area is now on NATO’s agenda.

• Climate Change: Climate change is already a cause célèbre, although still not fully mainstreamed into NATO strategy. That will change soon as NATO adapts to protect critical infrastructure. The next decade will also see some allies push for collective emissions reduction and ‘greening’ of militaries.

• Instability from the South: Da’esh, al Qaeda and climate change in the Sahel are already fuelling refugee flows into Europe – which impacts domestic politics in NATO nations. France is operating in the Sahel, but fears being trapped in a forever war. The UK and US are wary of deeper involvement but are aware that non-involvement will see Russia exploit regional frailties and Chinese influence grow on NATO’s southern flank. The ‘south’ is set to be a buzzword for NATO’s next decade.

• A Space Race: Astropolitics are also on NATO’s agenda. In 2019 NATO declared space as an operational domain and will establish a NATO Space Centre in Germany. But the space race is risky, especially with little legal framework. Russia’s space chief already said that the moon “could turn into another Afghanistan or Iraq” and in July 2020 a Russian military satellite fired a projectile towards a US counterpart. For NATO, space warfare will also add spice to delicate defence spending discussions.

Other challenges will inevitably emerge. Iran’s nuclear activity, or its internal unrest, may develop. Iran may also act to keep its corridor to the Mediterranean open (via Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut). The Strait of Hormuz is another flashpoint, where Iranian forces already test Western tolerance by stalking foreign ships – what happens if one test goes too far?

The ‘Middle East Cold War’ could also heat up, with NATO drawn-in because Turkey backs Qatar while other allies partner with Saudi Arabia (facing its own problems as the end of the oil era looms). Water could also submerge NATO in crisis, especially on its southern flank. When filled, Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will be Africa’s largest hydropower plant and the ‘tap’ of the River Nile. Careless use could spark a water war with neighbours, particularly Egypt. Potentially fraught transitions of power in Central Asia are also simmering and militarisation of the Arctic requires an ever-watchful NATO eye.

These varied challenges will test NATO’s current policymakers, who built careers on expeditionary warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO also struggles with fast-moving, multi-threat environments, given its culture of compartmentalising issues and its need for political authorisation before any planning or action.

Then there is the existential threat – from the inside.  The cohesion of the alliance is, by far, NATO’s most serious challenge. Internal tensions over “burden-sharing” in defence spending are well-known but NATO unity could be tested by a US pivot towards the Pacific or any other ally straying from the pack. Various independence movements in NATO nations may raise difficult membership questions in the coming years, but the Mediterranean is where internal problems are most likely to surface. Turkey's purchase of Russian military hardware and the discovery of undersea gas in the Aegean sea impacts the strategic thinking of multiple NATO members. Turkey’s agreement with Libya to drill in their waters is another potential flashpoint. In June 2020, France alleged that Turkish ships aimed weapons at one of their frigates off Libya’s coast.

Internal tension and differing perceptions among NATO allies are nothing new, but they will likely become more common in a multipolar era – with NATO's adversaries seeking to amplify any divisions. This is why ‘Alliance Cohesion’ will be the centrepiece of NATO’s revised Strategic Concept and the NATO 2030 initiative. It is NATO’s vaccine against the varied threats of a more contested, ever-evolving security environment.

The ‘So What’ For Afghanistan

Afghanistan is the glaring omission from this menu of challenges. For Afghans – and many foreigners who feel close to Afghanistan – this is hard to stomach. It may even feed an abandonment or a betrayal narrative, given that NATO is leaving as violence ramps up and the Taliban demonstrate that they are unchanged and untrustworthy. But the sobering strategic reality is that the era of NATO “projecting stability” outside its borders has morphed into the multi-threat world of today – where Afghanistan is no longer centre-stage in Western foreign policy thinking.

NATO is trying to make clear that it is not turning its back on Afghanistan. At the recent Summit and throughout recent months, NATO’s Secretary General has reiterated that it is a “new chapter” rather than closing the book, with NATO continuing to train and finance Afghan security forces, as well as support the functioning of Kabul airport. This shows that at least some NATO policymakers recognise the need for Afghanistan to remain on NATO’s agenda, even if it tumbles down the priority list. Whether comprehensive peace or total collapse, NATO will be tied to what happens in Afghanistan – and this legacy will shape what kind of future operations that allies (and adversaries) agree to in other theatres.

But what NATO could do better for Afghans is articulate – honestly – that it is challenged by a range of new threats. This message has either not reached Afghans, or it is drowned out by the sound of ever closer bullets and bombs. Afghans will comprehend that “NATO is the most successful alliance in history because we have been able to change when the world is changing”, as the Secretary General said at the NATO’s seventieth anniversary in 2019. More than anyone, Afghans know how quickly political and military alliances can crumble. They also understand growing global competition, advancing authoritarianism and continued instability – because they live it. What Afghans won’t respect (and what will feed an abandonment narrative) is feeling that they are being duped, or that Afghanistan simply isn’t interesting to NATO anymore – neither of which is true. 

NATO needs to do more than just talk to Afghans about leaving Afghanistan. It needs to make clear to them why, and how, NATO is transforming to meet the multipolar moment.

Ben Acheson is a former director of NATO’s Office of the Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan and an expert adviser on the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Dialogues on Afghanistan.

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The article does not reflect the official opinion of the AISS