By Naser Sidiqee

Ever since talks between the United States and the Taliban started in Doha, the capital of Qatar, no party to the conflict has benefitted more from the improvident process than the Taliban. By capitalizing on America’s withdrawal-oriented talks, the Taliban have brought their reputation back from the dead.

Despite the Taliban’s continued acts of terrorism and indiscriminate killing of civilians, the west led by the United States, continue to mask its private abhorrence by a rose-tinted public façade.

The fact that the international community led by the US is no longer the stern guardian of substantive democracy in Afghanistan is sufficiently evident form RAND Corporation’s recently published 198 pages research “Envisioning a Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Afghanistan.”

The research is based on the review of published material related to the so-called Afghan peace process, past peace agreements from around the world and face-to-face interviews with both government and non-government officials.

Although the authors claim to have provided a deeper insight into “a plausible [emphasis added] final comprehensive peace agreement for Afghanistan”, its pursuit of weakening the post-2001 political system and seeking compromises with corrupt politicians and intolerant Taliban cannot go unnoticed.

They also seem to have acquiesced, in the face of international community’s war weariness in general and growing appetite for a hasty withdrawal of troops in particular, to making way for the Taliban’s ascent to power.

Under the pretext of bringing peace, the proposed agreement with the Taliban is not only likely to undermine the steady process of institutionalizing democracy in Afghanistan, but also hold back and even reverse the heartening progress in aspects of fundamental human rights, women’s rights and freedom of expression.

General Assessment

The proposed peace agreement is highly likely to bring the process of state-building and strengthening of the state institutions to a complete halt. The proposal is crystal clear to form a transitional government that includes not only the Taliban but also facilitates redistribution of political power along the ethnic lines by ensuring inclusivity through “broad-based representation.”

Structurally and content-wise the proposed peace agreement is entirely pro-Taliban and pro-US - the arguments are framed in a manner that puts all the blame of the failures of the past 19 years on the Afghan people and the government. The troops' withdrawal as proposed in the Agreement does not, under any circumstances, guarantee stability. The term that is used is "some prospects of stability." It is argued that peace agreements are limited in what they can achieve which seems to be self-contradictory. If peace agreement can achieve anything, and that’s what they should aim for, it is peace and stability. If it cannot guarantee that, then it should not be called a Peace Agreement.

In addition, the proposed Agreement, and probably the entire exercise, seems to be undertaken with a fundamentally wrong assumption that there is no Afghan state in place and the international community is seeking the Taliban's help to build one. This will only strengthen the Taliban’s original narrative that they are fighting statelessness.

Methodology

In terms of methodology, studying only 34 Peace Agreements, made between 1989 and 2015 without sufficiently explaining the selection criteria, is a major shortfall. Also to what extent those peace agreements addressed the issues of civil wars and proxy wars is not adequately explained.

It is also mentioned during the literature review, published material from all parties to the conflict was carefully studies. However, it is not clear as to what material from the Taliban's side was studied given that those are mainly propaganda material.

Most importantly, the perspective of the people of Afghanistan is missing. The idea is to bring peace and stability to the people of Afghanistan and any such deal would defeat its purpose without accommodating their views and aspirations.

Some Inconsistencies

Some arguments in the research are serving no other purpose than building the case for a subsequent argument. For example, it is stated that the post-2001 war is a continuation of the 40 years of war in Afghanistan. Many would actually refute such a statement. It seems that it has been tried to pave the way for the preamble of the proposed agreement which reads "Recognizing and honoring the sacrifices on all sides." This line basically includes the Taliban and their suicide bombers in the same category as ANDSF and Civilian martyrs. Simply put, it justifies terrorism.

The research also refers to all those forces that have been fighting against the Taliban as "Anti-Taliban” which after a rigorous analysis, only victimizes the Taliban and depicts others as oppressors. Such arguments can only be interpreted as delegitimizing the long struggle of the Afghan people for freedom and prosperity.

The international community is apparently seeking to bring peace in Afghanistan but have no appetite for continued intervention. The research fails to capture the fact that the international community intervened in Afghanistan because 9/11 happened, not because they felt sorry for the people of Afghanistan. Without getting sufficient guarantees from the Taliban and addressing the issue of their safe havens, the departure of the international community would be only irresponsible at best.

When discussing the US’ ability to forge regional and global consensus, the authors appear to be overstating some countries’ willing to positively contribute i.e. Iran’s role in the process. It would be interesting that after the humiliating betrayal of 2002, when Iranians helped the US overthrow the Taliban and then be included in the “Axis of Evil”, they would support any US effort. In the wake of mounting US sanctions against Iran and the declining power of the moderates, any cooperation with the US would mean political suicide. Iran, under these circumstances, would probably like to see the US fails in war and in peace in Afghanistan.

Moreover, he proposed peace agreement does not sufficiently accommodate/address the issue of the Taliban’s Drug Trade-related activities, other illicit economic activities, violation of human rights, and most importantly their complete disarmament.

So how can a square deal be reached with the Taliban without forcing Afghanistan’s nascent democracy to decline?

Part of the answer lies in understanding of Taliban’s motivations. They seem to be attracted by the west’s war weariness and a lack of appetite for continued intervention in Afghanistan. They are also driven by their confidence at the prospect of overpowering, militarily and politically, the Afghan government, should the international troops withdraw even without reaching a peace agreement.

The Taliban was, and seem to remain, largely dependent on their safe havens beyond Afghanistan’s borders. Therefore, it is crucial to remember that without addressing this issue, any agreement will not guarantee west’s security.

Also prioritizing a hasty and withdrawal-oriented peace agreement over strengthening fundamental tenets of a democracy will get in the way of implementing such an agreement.

Mr. Naser Sidiqee is a development practitioner, observer of Afghan political history and lecturer at Dunya University of Afghanistan.

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The article does not reflect the official opinion of the AISS.