By Neelapu Shanti

“Dharmo rakshati rakshitah” - when you safeguard righteousness, it will safeguard you.

Whenever power removes all checks from its path, its moral compass falters. Afghanistan has become a casualty of strategic arrogance—political witchcraft posing as statecraft.

Guided by realpolitik and sidelining both moral and strategic legacies towards the people of Afghanistan, India has, after two years of rigorous engagement and forced closure of the Republic Afghan mission-unethically, finally hosted the Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi—an entity still under the United Nations terrorist sanctions list to New Delhi last month.

Following this visit, India is restoring full diplomatic relations. The Indian technical mission constituted in Kabul after the Taliban’s forcible takeover in August 2021, was upgraded to a full-fledged embassy in October. Media reports suggest that India is expected to appoint a second diplomat to the Afghan mission in New Delhi by December or early next year—its first such appointment since the Taliban’s return to power.

India’s rapprochement with the Taliban, framed as “engagement without recognition,” needs to uphold its commitment to democracy and gender equality with Kabul. As Afghanistan descends deeper into humanitarian and political crisis, New Delhi’s silence on human rights, women’s education, and governance raises a critical question: why is such engagement viewed as a strategic calculus when it involves an illegitimate regime founded on repression?

Taliban rule lacks legitimacy. Afghanistan lacks a government. India’s claim to support the Taliban as a strategic necessity rather than Afghanistan’s legitimate government is untenable.

Taliban–Pakistan Friction and India’s Calculus

During Muttaqi’s six-day stay in New Delhi, border clashes intensified between Pakistan and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), allegedly backed by the Afghan Taliban.

MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stated, “We are closely monitoring the situation. Pakistan hosts terrorist organisations and sponsors terrorism—it is an old habit to blame neighbours.”

In response, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif accused the Taliban of “fighting a proxy war” on India’s behalf.

Lt Gen Prakash Katoch, writing for South Asia Monitor (October 24), noted that while the October 19 Afghanistan–Pakistan ceasefire remains fragile, “the Taliban’s refusal to recognise the Durand Line and Pakistan’s fortified border ensure hostilities cannot be ruled out.” With both sides adept at suicide and guerrilla tactics, he warned that Pakistan’s growing exposure to Taliban–TTP influence bodes ill for India and the region.

For over a month, tensions along the Durand Line have not only strained Taliban–Pakistan relations but also deepened economic suffering for border communities. Transit closures, halted trade, and widespread unemployment have compounded local misery.

Amid this friction, the Taliban government unveiled a controversial “Greater Afghanistan” map, incorporating Pakistani territory—including large Pashtun regions—into Afghanistan. The map was formally presented to Taliban Deputy Interior Minister Mohammad Nabi Omari in Khost province.

The suffering of ordinary Afghans already trapped between rival powers are immense.

Taliban Pakistan Peace Talks

At last month’s Istanbul peace talks, Pakistani officials privately admitted that U.S. drone strikes in Afghan provinces were launched from Pakistani bases under a covert deal with Washington—a revelation briefly recorded before being deleted. The erasure spoke volumes.

Publicly, Islamabad condemned the strikes as violations of sovereignty; privately, it enabled them to preserve U.S. aid and influence over Kabul. The incident exposed Pakistan’s long-standing duplicity: moral posturing abroad, strategic bargaining at home.

This duplicity extends to Pakistan’s refugee narrative. For decades, it has claimed generosity toward Afghan refugees, though every phase of that “hospitality” was financed by international donors. Pakistani contractors and agencies profited while Afghans were later accused of ingratitude. The current mass deportations to freezing border zones have stripped away the last pretence of solidarity.

Strategically, Islamabad once treated Afghanistan as both buffer and proxy, even channelling militant pipelines toward Kashmir. But today’s Taliban reject its control. To restore leverage, Pakistan has again turned to covert cooperation with Washington.

The Istanbul deletion was not bureaucratic tidying—it was the moment the mask slipped. The third round of talks between Taliban and Pakistan remain inconclusive last week.

TTP Factor

Pakistan’s long legacy as an epicentre of global terrorism gave birth to the Taliban during the Afghan civil war of 1994, backed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and financed by the United States with military and logistical support. The enduring Pakistan–Taliban nexus undermined Afghanistan’s peace efforts and obstructed past negotiations with the former Afghan Republic.

As Brig. V. Mahalingam noted on X (formerly Twitter): “What we are seeing in Pakistan is a part of the battle for Jihad being fought by TTP and supported by Taliban. This is part of the strategy spelt out by Ayman al-Zawahiri to his followers after he assumed command of Al Qaeda after Osama bin Laden. Pakistan has not yet understood the game. US presence and Pak resources being given to foreign countries are rallying points for Pakistanis. Expect full support from Taliban for Jihad. Tehreek-e-Labbaik is waiting in the wings to join the battle at an appropriate time”.

Pakistan once sought to rule Afghanistan through its proxies. Today, that creation has turned into a liability. The TTP, operating from Afghan bases, now wages an insurgency against Pakistan with Taliban sympathy and ideological backing. The TTP’s deep ties to al-Qaeda—reaffirmed publicly in April 2021—ensure that its violence will remain a central threat to Pakistan and regional stability.

India and the Taliban: From Opposition to Engagement

In 1992, the Afghan Mujahideen, who were initially supported by Pakistan, captured Kabul, but over time they turned into enemies of Islamabad and drew closer to New Delhi. A similar scene repeated itself in 2021; the Taliban, who had been supported by Pakistan for years, took Kabul, but today they too are establishing relations with India and once again sidelining Pakistan.

The people of Afghanistan feel that New Delhi appears to be taking advantage of the strained relations between the Taliban and Pakistan by hosting the Taliban Foreign Minister.

Having gained Russian recognition, the Taliban now seek India’s endorsement to bolster their global legitimacy. The very fact that Pakistan which created, armed, funded and provided shelter to Taliban and its leadership and supported them diplomatically, under the most trying conditions is today, in less than two years, the group’s arch enemy goes to prove, that the Taliban will not change its methods, as they are bound by their ideology and not through friendship or help.

Expecting any kind of support from the Taliban in return for India’s diplomatic support which does not endorse the Afghan people’s legitimate interest is nothing but a pipe dream.

Perhaps, therefore, the right questions to ponder are: entrusting Afghanistan to the Taliban who has no foreboding in shifting sides, escalating and proliferating terrorism and extremism at multiple fronts while providing safe havens to terrorist groups, whose terrorist activities have found fertile soil there, pose a long-term threat to the entire region.

Afghanistan remains without a representative government; engaging the Taliban as a de facto authority without demanding accountability erodes India’s moral position and long-standing support for democratic governance.

Taliban-Double faced

Muttaqi’s visit was notable as the Taliban publicly affirmed support for India’s sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir. India, in turn, reiterated its commitment to Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity at a time when Taliban-Pakistan relations have reached a low point amid intense border clashes. Earlier this week, the Taliban accused Pakistan of attempting to destabilise Afghanistan to pave the way for a possible US return to the Bagram airbase.

As reported in BBC news in 2021, Taliban’s Spokesman, Suhail Shaheen commented on the Kashmir issue, “As Muslims, we also have a right to raise our voice for Muslims in Kashmir, India or any other country”. The question is how and why Taliban has changed its stance on Kashmir issue within a span of 2 years’ time?

As India reiterated its commitment to Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Equally, if India truly supported Afghanistan’s sovereignty, why did it remain passive when the elected Ghani government fell in 2021- New Delhi could have intervened more meaningfully—but that required deploying troops, a step never taken.

How can India reconcile its historic anti-Taliban stance—supporting the Northern Alliance in the 1990s—with today’s overtures to the same regime it once opposed?

India’s Missed Opportunities to Help Afghanistan

India’s Afghanistan policy has long been marked by missed opportunities. Before U.S. intervention in 2001, the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee rejected the US proposal to send Indian ground troops to Afghanistan for the post-9/11 "Operation Enduring Freedom" to assist the Northern Alliance — an idea that could have strengthened India’s strategic posture.

Similarly, the 2015 suggestion by Lt Gen HS Lidder, former CISC to deploy Army commandos, disguised as ITBP personnel, to guard Indian missions was dismissed, limiting India’s intelligence reach. NSA Ajit Doval’s response was: “My ITBP commandos are as good as Army SF”. The result was ITBP only guarded missions – no intelligence gathering, no operations in conjunction with the Afghan National Army.

The subsequent closure of the Ayni and Farkhor air bases in Tajikistan — once key outposts for Indian influence in Central Asia — further reduced India’s strategic leverage.

Fear of antagonizing China or provoking Pakistan, India’s support for independence movements in Sindh and Balochistan remain negligible. These hesitations reveal a recurring dilemma: how to balance realpolitik with India’s aspiration for regional leadership.

Security Threat

A Sentinel News report (1 November) noted that Indian security agencies remain on alert following AQIS calls for “lone wolf” attacks in India. Previous AQIS attempts to establish modules in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, and northern states illustrate persistent threats.

Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS-K, and the Haqqani Network now operate in mutual support from Afghan soil—creating a volatile nexus that imperils regional security.

India’s Lack of Moral Standing on Afghan Women’s Rights

According to the UN, 80% of Afghan school-age girls—around 2.5 million—are denied education. Yet India’s response to Afghanistan’s social and humanitarian crises has been limited. A May 2025 UN report documents Taliban decrees that seek to erase women from public life, while New Delhi’s symbolic gestures have replaced meaningful action.

India’s decision to cut funding to the only Afghan refugee school in New Delhi and restrict student visas has further disheartened Afghan girls who once viewed India as a beacon of opportunity. By contrast, tangible steps—safe refuge for activists, support for women-led groups, and targeted aid—could have demonstrated moral leadership consistent with India’s democratic ideals.

Afghanistan’s social contract is not beyond repair, but it demands renewed solidarity, not silence. In true sense, India failed to address concerns of the Afghans appeasing the Taliban for its geopolitical gains.

What Do Afghans want?

The absence of a coherent grand strategy has left Afghans mired in uncertainty and despair. True strategy must define ends, ways, and means—pursuing inclusive governance and equality for all Afghans. Such a framework is essential for restoring stability and dignity.

If New Delhi aligns its strategic interests with compassion and principle—addressing humanitarian needs today while advocating inclusive governance tomorrow—it will demonstrate that leadership lies not in expediency but in conviction.

A stable, democratic Afghanistan offers India lasting influence in South–West–Central Asia and deeper regional integration. Yet India must recognize that adopting an “enemy of my enemy” logic is eroding the trust it has built among the Afghan people.

Neelapu Shanti is a New Delhi Based international affairs research analyst, writer, journalist and Indo-Afghan analyst. MA in International Relations Post-Graduate in Journalism.

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The article does not reflect the official opinion of the AISS.