By Abdul Naser Noorzad

Today, more than ever, Badakhshan has become a stage for security and geopolitical challenges against the Taliban’s mono-ethnic rule. The province’s strategic location, rich underground resources, and its position at the intersection of three key security zones—South Asia (via Chitral, Pakistan), Central Asia (via the border with Tajikistan’s Badakhshan), and the People’s Republic of China (via the Wakhan Corridor and Kashgar)—have doubled its importance. If these challenges are managed wisely, they could become an opportunity for Afghanistan’s liberation from ethnic terrorism and for strengthening the resistance movement. However, if only internal and external mafia actors dominate the scene, there is little hope for positive change in favor of the people.

In the silent mountains and glittering mines of Badakhshan, a hidden but decisive battle is underway. This battle is not merely between local commanders and Chinese company guards; it reflects deep ethnic, economic, and geopolitical contradictions that have placed the future of northeastern Afghanistan on the brink of explosion. The recent security incident in Shahr-e Bozorg district of Badakhshan was not just an armed clash, but a political-security earthquake with far-reaching consequences for Afghanistan and the region.

In the past three years, Badakhshan has become one of the most crucial areas for Persian-speaking and Tajik communities. Its significance for the Taliban’s future and its role in the domino-like collapse of the north are undeniable. Reports of active multinational terrorist groups, Pakistan’s attempts to seize Wakhan, and the sensitivities of China and Russia toward this region all indicate that Badakhshan holds a special place in the region’s security doctrine.

But what is really happening in Badakhshan? Is this geography on the verge of challenging developments for the Taliban and the beginning of a new phase of competition between the US, Russia, and China? The recent incident in the Dawang area of Shahr-e Bozorg, following a violent clash between the men of Mullah Nasruddin (a prominent jihadi figure) and Chinese company guards, which resulted in at least eight deaths—including four Chinese nationals and Qari Abdulwaris (Nasruddin’s son)—has highlighted the severity of the crisis. Field sources say the clash occurred when Nasruddin’s men demanded a share of the gold mine but faced armed resistance from the Chinese guards. The violence was so intense that some of the Chinese bodies were thrown into the river.

Major powers, due to Badakhshan’s geographical position and underground resources, are seeking to increase their influence in the province and exploit its resources. Analyzing this incident without understanding the current power structure of the Taliban is incomplete. The Taliban, composed of southern tribal networks, are rewriting local power structures under the banner of security. Removing local commanders and replacing them with figures from Helmand and Kandahar is part of the Taliban’s internal geopolitical project. The Taliban are not only partners in Chinese projects but are also engineering resource management and suppressing local resistance.

The entry of Chinese companies into Afghanistan’s mines, ostensibly with promises of technology and employment, is, in reality, something else. With Taliban support, Chinese companies are exploiting the mines. Local workers are paid meager wages without any job security, while the profits flow to Kabul, Kandahar, and Beijing. In this equation, China is not just an investor but a strategic partner of the Taliban in implementing a form of economic colonialism, with the consent of parts of the Taliban central government. This model mimics similar Chinese projects in Africa, but in Afghanistan, the balance of ethnic power and a history of resistance pose serious obstacles to Beijing’s full dominance.

The key question is: to what extent can these developments and security challenges strengthen resistance and increase security challenges for the Taliban? With the killing of Mullah Nasruddin’s son and the ignition of public anger, the people of the region have united around local commanders. This reaction is not just a family tragedy but signals the beginning of a new local resistance—against resource plundering, ethnic domination, and foreign colonialism. This time, the issue is not just opium, but ancestral land and historical identity being looted.

Simultaneously, the arrest of Makhdum Alam Rabbani (an Uzbek figure and Taliban commander) by Taliban intelligence is part of the Taliban’s engineered operation to silence any dissent. This move is a warning for the fate of northern ethnic groups and the systematic elimination of non-Pashtun figures from the Taliban’s power equation. This spark of social explosion in the northeast may push the Taliban toward further repression and the removal of non-Pashtuns from the power structure.

In conclusion, the events in Badakhshan and the ongoing plundering of mines with Taliban and Chinese support, disregard for local commanders, and the exclusion of ethnic minorities from power could turn the Taliban’s internal rifts into a political fault line. Repeated similar clashes and public awakening to the dimensions of this new colonialism could pave the way for waves of armed protests, autonomous movements, or even separatist tendencies in northeastern Afghanistan. The Taliban know well that Badakhshan is not just a piece of land; it is a historical memory, ethnic pride, and a treasure belonging to all of Afghanistan. What happened in Dawang is a sign of a larger crisis: the Taliban’s legitimacy crisis in the north, the people’s distrust of foreign projects, and the crisis of ethnic representation in the ruling structure. This battle is not just over gold, but for reclaiming the people’s identity and ownership of their land. If this trend continues, this time, not only from the mountains of Panjshir but also from the gold mines of Badakhshan, the voice of a new resistance will be heard.

Abdul Naser Noorzad was a lecturer at Kabul University. He has an MA in National Security Studies. He has written a couple of books about Afghanistan's security and political situation and has published dozens of articles in English, Persian, and Spanish. His research area includes security and politics.

Academicians and Officials interested to publish their academic pieces on this page, please approach us through: contact@aissonline.org.

The article does not reflect the official opinion of the AISS.