By Neelapu Shanti

An Evaluation of Muttaqi’s Visit to India

Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi arrived in New Delhi at the invitation of India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), following his participation in the Moscow Format meeting earlier this week. The media presented this visit as highly significant. Officials from Russia, India, Pakistan, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan joined their Taliban counterparts in opposing any external attempts to deploy military infrastructure in Afghanistan. This development coincides with renewed calls by the U.S. President Donald Trump for the Taliban regime to hand over control of the strategic Bagram Airbase.

Muttaqi, who remains on the United Nations Security Council’s list of designated terrorists, was granted a special travel exemption after the Council had previously delayed approval of his visit in September. His presence in India raises a critical question: Does New Delhi’s engagement with the Taliban serve the interests of the Afghan people-or merely reflect shifting geopolitical pragmatism?

The Moscow Format and Bagram Theatre

The Moscow meeting, which was apparently held with the aim of creating a regional consensus on Afghanistan, in practice turned into an exhibition of geopolitical hostilities. Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Iran view Trump’s return to Bagram base as a threat to their territory. Recently the US has issued a warning stating, “We gave it to [the Taliban] for nothing. We want that base back,” he said. Two days later, this time opting to express his views on social media, Trump wrote: “If Afghanistan doesn’t give Bagram air base back to those that built it, the United States of America, bad things are going to happen!”

None of the major participants exerted meaningful pressure on the Taliban to establish an inclusive government or uphold democratic and human rights principles. Meanwhile, Iran and Pakistan deported thousands of Afghans back to Afghanistan this year; India forced to shut down the former republic Afghan Embassy in New Delhi; China exploited Afghanistan’s resources; and Russia formally recognized the Taliban. The question remains: where do we stand for the Afghans today? Could we accept a similar structure of governance in our own countries as the one under which the Taliban now rule? Do regional powers truly understand the nature of dominance exercised by non-state actors-dominance that the Afghan people continue to endure? Each of these countries viewed Afghanistan as a platform for advancing its own security narrative.

The Taliban fighting the United States will remain a pipedream!

From Partnership to Neglect

Over the past three years, India’s approach to the Taliban has undergone a perceptible shift, prompting questions about whether this recalibration aligns with the interests of the Afghan people. When the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India, has been asked about India’s stance on the Taliban-whether it intends to recognize them or why it has moved toward a Taliban-oriented policy and the forced closure of the Afghan mission in New Delhi- the responses have often been ambiguous. The standard reply, typically beginning with references to India’s “historical relations, friendship with the Afghan people, and relevant United Nations resolutions, including UNSCR 2593,” offers little clarity. How did India stay away from UN resolution for Afghan people? A deafening silence!

The situation at the Afghan Embassy in New Delhi in 2023 was nothing short of a coup. It cannot be dismissed as a mere administrative power struggle. India has no legal authority to appoint Afghan ambassadors, yet it has tacitly allowed Taliban-linked individuals to occupy the premises.

India’s re-engagement with the Taliban began in 2022, with the Taliban led Afghanistan as a “technical mission” in Kabul to oversee humanitarian assistance. Simultaneously, India stopped issuing visas to diplomats appointed by the legitimate Republic government but continued to grant medical and trade visas to Taliban members and their families. To the comity to nations, India failed to extend due diplomatic courtesy to the Republic government of Afghanistan and its representatives.

For many Afghans, this shift marked the end of a once-strong civilizational relationship. The night of 22–23 November 2023, when Taliban-linked individuals - Zakia Wardak and Sayed Mohammad Ibrahimkhil - entered the Afghan Embassy in New Delhi with apparent MEA acquiescence, symbolized India’s quiet concession. 

MEA too bears responsibility for the state of affairs as till today they have not put out a ‘read out’ to clarify the situation of Afghan Embassy’s closure in 2023.

But consider the following:

- let us be clear, today there is no legitimate Government in Afghanistan. Taliban had snatched power in Afghanistan by force.

- None of the countries in the world including UN has recognised the Taliban except Russia.

- Taliban are the same group which attacked India’s interests in Afghanistan, hijacked Indian Airlines flight to Kandahar sponsored by Pakistan.

- Taliban continue to ban education for women and girls in Afghanistan, human rights violation and right to self-determination.

- Why has India allowed Taliban-appointed representatives in New Delhi since 2023, effectively silencing the legitimate voice of the Afghan Republic? What justifies sidelining the previous ambassador, whose leadership in addressing Afghan community concerns was far more legitimate and credible than that of the current group of unelected, terror-linked individuals occupying the Afghan Embassy in New Delhi?

- The wheat shipment, scholarships to Afghanistan students, running an Afghan school etc was being done under the Ghani Government nominated embassy in New Delhi.

Hence there is no question of recognising the Taliban Government or allowing Taliban appointed Ambassador to function in Delhi who have silenced the voice of the people of Afghanistan.

Muttaqi’s Visit and Diplomatic Legitimacy

Mutaqqi will be meeting with External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. According to official accounts, the discussions will focus on counterterrorism, trade, and the strengthening of bilateral ties-potentially including the reinstatement of full-fledged ambassadors and the expansion of consular presence.

The renewal of India–Taliban engagement, raise pressing questions about India’s credibility as a steadfast strategic partner of the Afghan people-a partnership historically sustained over several decades finally drifted away from its standpoint in 2023.

The media reports tended to portray this engagement as a pragmatic move by India, ostensibly motivated by security concerns amid the United States’ return to the Bagram base-an action frequently interpreted as an attempt to contain Russia and China, justify potential aggression against Iran, and manage India’s strained relations with Pakistan. However, such representations reflect a reductive geopolitical narrative that overlooks the concerns of the Afghan people, who are ruled by a terrorist organisation and refuse to form an inclusive government in Afghanistan despite the commitments made in the Doha peace agreement.

The question is whether the Taliban, a group stricken by its hunger for recognition and composed of various terror factions that are strengthening their base in the northern part of Afghanistan, will actually fight for regional security? Are we collectively combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism to ensure that Afghan soil is not used to wage proxy wars? No!

Kabul will be made to boil again!

Important Question to Ponder:

- Under the 1961 Geneva Convention on Diplomatic Relations, do host governments possess the authority to recognize or appoint ambassadors of foreign states without legitimate representation? If not, India has no authority to appoint an Ambassador of Afghanistan in New Delhi.

- What tangible economic or strategic benefits does India expect to derive from engaging with the Taliban in the absence of peace and stability in Afghanistan?

- The MEA is well aware that Taliban-affiliated representatives continue to operate under the flag of the Republic of Afghanistan-a calculated attempt to gain legitimacy without recognition. The Afghan Embassy in New Delhi remains functionally leaderless; without formal presentation of credentials to the President of India, the diplomatic procedure itself becomes farcical.

India-Pakistan Proxy War

For many Afghans, India’s overtures to the Taliban represent a choice of political expediency over principle, particularly when relations between the Taliban and Pakistan are deteriorating. The clashes between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters and Pakistan near the Afghan border, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa border and areas of Balochistan has been intensified in the recent times.

Afghanistan’s former Foreign Minister and National Security Advisor Rangin Dadfar Spanta, who served with former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, said that neither Delhi nor Islamabad should see the visit in terms of their rivalry. “India’s current policy towards Afghanistan is mainly determined by an anti-Pakistan approach. Both Pakistan and the government in Delhi are looking for proxies. This is not about good neighbourliness or peace in our region. Unfortunately, the opposite is true.”

A recent New York Times report indicates that since the Taliban’s return to power, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has strengthened its organization and intensified attacks on Pakistani security forces. The report asserts that the TTP receives financial and logistical support from the Afghan Taliban, though the regime in Kabul denies such links.

The US State Department has reported that the Taliban continue to recruit children into their military ranks. The Diplomat further noted that some of these fighters have established joint bases in Panjshir, while others have set up bases in the provinces of Balkh, Badakhshan, Kunduz, Kabul, and Baghlan.

What Afghanistan needs today- A Reality

Afghanistan’s war is far from over. Peace, security, and governance are unlikely to improve under the Taliban’s dominance, which rests on no legitimacy, no adherence to democratic principles, and no recognition from the United Nations or the international community-except Russia. On the contrary, signs of escalation of the conflict in the coming time are clearly discernable.

Reconciliation with the Taliban, without the creation of an inclusive government to secure political stability, is unlikely to succeed. This is compounded by the lack of will and assertiveness from major powers, including India, and by Pakistan’s persistent quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan. The Afghan economy remains in crisis, worsening political uncertainty. These compelling circumstances have further narrowed the political space for any meaningful, representative political order to take root.

Against this backdrop, New Delhi’s gradual accommodation of the Taliban appears to be well underway, despite its awareness of the group’s ideological hostility towards its own people. Proponents of realpolitik may argue that official recognition of the Taliban government is inevitable, given the failure of international efforts to establish an inclusive government in Afghanistan.

However, such a move has undermined India’s moral standing and its long-cultivated goodwill among Afghans, along with the nostalgic sentiment associated with the ‘Kabuliwala days.’  The Afghan people are far more important than petty geopolitical considerations. While the Taliban is a current reality, it is not a permanent structure capable of sustaining Afghanistan’s future.

Choice is ours!

Neelapu Shanti is a New Delhi Based international affairs research analyst, writer, journalist and Indo-Afghan analyst. MA in International Relations Post-Graduate in Journalism.

Academicians and Officials interested to publish their academic pieces on this page, please approach us through: contact@aissonline.org.

The article does not reflect the official opinion of the AISS.